What do you think NATO should do?

I think there’s a big responsibility here. I believe NATO at least publicly but more so through diplomatic channels should talk to Russia and consider reviewing their policy vis-à-vis the Caucasus, Ukraine. I’m not suggesting that they change anything, but at least they should be prepared at this stage to sit down and talk with Russia and express the willingness to review things, to see if they can come up with an option that will be viable and also acceptable to all parties.

So you’re suggesting NATO should back down on their positions on membership?

That has to be mutually agreed upon. I understand NATO’s position, that they don’t want to be dictated to by anybody as they decide what they will do with membership issues, but given the circumstances and what we have seen in these past three weeks and particularly after Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, I think it would be worthwhile to put that ‘pride’ aside and sit down for the benefit of global harmony and also for the benefit of the Caucasus, sit down and talk with each other and come up with a viable option that will be beneficial for all.

Don’t you feel vulnerable to Russian expansion?

We’ve never felt that. We do not have any particular problem with Russia. What concerns us today is that our room to maneuver will be extremely limited given the fact that Russia and Georgia, for Armenia, are vital neighbors. If Russia is our strategic partner, then Georgia is our natural partner. Our trade goes thru Georgia, historically we have had excellent ties. So this tension between Russia and Georgia, and I would even go a step further to qualify this as tension between the West and Russia, by proxy, will put Armenia in a difficult situation. For a decade, when I was foreign minister, we implemented a policy of complementarity clearly saying to everybody that we will not choose between Russia and the U.S. Armenia can not afford to choose. I think that whole issue now has come closer to home and Armenia should even enhance that complementarity by clearly telling everybody that choosing is not an option for Armenia.

Why not? Russia is expanding, why not choose against Russia?

We shouldn’t rush to the conclusion that Russia is expanding. Maybe what Russia has done is a consequence of a sequence of steps and missteps by both sides. I’m not putting blame on any one side, or, maybe I’m putting the blame on everybody. This is the time when cool heads should prevail, not just in Russia and Georgia but also the West. In the heat of things, lots of resentments are being expressed. I think there is a moment there. There is an opportunity so that we sit down and talk – all of us, Brussels, Moscow and Washington should sit down with Yerevan, Tbilisi and Baku — and come up with a viable option for this region, so that we turn the Caucasus into a non-aligned Caucasus. Because the Caucasus is too small to accommodate several security alliances especially when they are exclusionary.

So, keep the Russians out, keep the Americans out, make the Caucasus a non-aligned neutral area.

I think that will be a viable option. I don’t see how we can proceed with this kind of tension. It’s not just detrimental for our region but also for global politics. I don’t think the world these days can afford this kind of tension, this Cold War redux, because there are more pressing issues before Russia, the US and the international community. Our focus should be on those issues rather than fighting proxy wars in different regions.

But it has to be said that with Russia in its current mood and the US in its current mood, this is not going to happen, is it?

Let’s look at the reasons for those moods. There’s lots of resentment there that have accumulated since the collapse of the USSR. There has been a sequence of misunderstandings that have led to this kind of situation. In the past 400 years, the world has gone through at least four, five major transformations. After each major war and conflict, a new system has emerged, at each new mechanisms and new institutions have emerged to constitute a new world order to regulate state relationships. The end of the Cold War is the exception. The very institutions that contributed to the defeat of the USSR remained as the main pillars of the so-called new world order. That was natural back then when Russia and China were weak. Today’s Russia and China are not the same. Insisting on those institutions particularly the security ones, to operate the way they used to, is not sustainable.