-Mr. Oskanian, how do you assess the fact that in Sochi, the sides agreed on the preamble to the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement documents?  Is this in sync with the initial principle guiding these discussions that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed?”

-That principle exists precisely for such complicated issues as Karabakh; every sentence of every relevant document is interrelated and every word is consequential. For this very reason, in agreeing on any public declaration, utmost caution must be exercised since not everything in the negotiating document is agreed to. In that regard, the declaration you cite, is at least cause for worry, since as a result of similar earlier “agreements,” whether the Meindorf or Athens declarations, Azerbaijan received plenty to use to its advantage.

-Pressure only counts if you submit to it. It’s possible to place deadlines, but only if within those timeframes, documents and decisions are not adopted that go against our interests. Taking into account recent experience when in the framework of the Armenia-Turkey process, under deadlines, documents were created which do in fact go counter to our interests, then deadlines are indeed cause for concern.

-Overall, how do you evaluate the latest developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process?

-The thing that worries me most is Turkey’s active involvement and the fact that the Armenia-Turkey process has further complicated the Karabakh settlement. Now, all our energy must be aimed at separating these two processes, and at the same time, finding a way to address the increasingly more complicated challenge of defending our rights during the negotiations.

-In comparison to the increased activity surrounding the NK negotiations, one would think the Armenia-Turkey reconciliation process was on hold. Doesn’t this mean that before moving to ratify the protocols Turkey is indeed waiting for progress on the Karabakh question, as so many Turkish high officials have frequently stated? In your opinion, is the settlement process in fact progressing based on that condition?

-In principle, continuing to try to predict when and whether Turkey will ratify the protocols, and under what conditions, is already irrelevant. From the beginning, it was clear where this process would end up. Turkey has already received the minimum to which it aspired both in regard to the content of the documents, and in exploiting the entire process for its own ends. Now it’s trying to gain the maximum by achieving a speedy conclusion to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.

-During the last OSCE ministerial council, member states’ foreign ministers accepted a document that said that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be resolved according to three principles of the Helsinki Final Act -- the principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity, and the right of peoples to self-determination, while in the Madrid principles, the issue of Karabakh’s status will follow the return of territory and refugees. Isn’t there the danger that in the case of the Madrid principles, the principle of national self-determination in regards Nagorno-Karabakh will not be decisive?

-The problem is not in the sequence of the principles; documents which confirm that the solution of the NK conflict must be based on the two principles -- territorial integrity and self-determination -- must be avoided so long as Azerbaijan has not publicly acknowledged that the people of NK have the right to adopt any manifestation of their right to self-determination, and so long as the details of the application of that right to self-determination have not yet been clarified.

-How do you assess the constitutional court decision and Turkey’s uproar in response? Would it be right that the parliament ratifies the protocols with reservations, as the Dashnaksutyun proposes?

-We should call a spade a spade. This is not the time to be evenhanded, and play both sides of the fence. This simply further complicates the situation, as I believe, everyone’s had ample time to comprehend.   From the beginning, these documents could not have served as the foundation on which our two countries could build a stable relationship. There was no need to waste a year to try to persuade each other, lose time, and to divert attention from more significant problems.

-How do you assess the news that there are already steps being taken towards arriving at the  participation of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiations? After determining the principles of the settlement, will Karabakh’s participation not be merely a formal step, to keep up appearances?

-It seems there hasn’t been official confirmation of this.  But that without Nagorno-Karabakh’s agreement, there can be no resolution to this issue – this must be an irrevocable and undeniable principle of the Armenian side. As to whether their participation at that time will be more formal, than significant, will depend on the degree and extent to which Karabakh’s authorities have been involved and engaged in the development and acceptance of those principles.

-Of the co-chair countries, is it the Russian Federation’s desires that are the determining ones? Is the Russian Federation not using the Karabakh conflict to resolve its own economic, territorial and geopolitical issues – that is, taking into account recent events, such as their arrangement with Azerbaijan to buy a large quantity of gas, and the mutually beneficial agreements arrived at during Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Moscow?

-I am convinced that Russia does seek a settlement, in fact, exactly for the reasons stated here. With the Karabakh problem settled, Russia will be freer to deepen its relationship with Armenia for its own strategic interests, and with Azerbaijan for geopolitical and energy reasons. This means that it would be short-sighted to make plans or calculations based on the belief that regardless of how things develop, Armenia would receive Russia’s unconditional support.

-With the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or the Armenia-Turkey reconciliation processes, what role or interest does or can Iran have? This question was raised following Robert Kocharian’s visit to Iran. Does his visit in fact have any connection to this question?

-The question about the second president’s trip perhaps you should direct towards him. As for Iran, in contrast, for example with Turkey, although it isn’t directly involved, its balanced position has had a positive effect on the Karabakh settlement process. Of course, Iran, too has interests. We talked about Russia’s interests already. Other countries, too, have interests in our region. Each state moves based on its own interest. But that shouldn’t be perceived fatalistically. Armenia’s task is to clearly picture, articulate and defend our own interests, and not just to go with the flow.