Azerbaijan’s minister of foreign affairs has found generally acceptable the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ new version of the principles for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, proposed last December in Greece. This is the first occasion since 1997 that Baku has found the mediators’ proposal acceptable.

Now, it is Armenia’s turn and it will be difficult for Armenia to say "Yes" to the version that took shape first in Krakow in July 2009, then in Athens at the end of 2009 and then in Sochi on January 25, 2010, because in contrast to the 2007 Madrid proposals, not only is the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination very vague, but in terms of removing the consequences of the conflict, Azerbaijan is at an advantage.

Since 1997, Azerbaijan has either rejected or withheld consent to all settlement proposals; it also rejected the Madrid document presented in 2007. And now, over the course of a mere two years, the mediators have presented proposals which are acceptable to Azerbaijan and unacceptable for Armenia. Refusing the mediators’ proposal comes at a price. And what is very important is who does the rejecting, and on what basis. Especially since proposals are the outcome of a negotiations process, the negotiating sides are equally responsible for the contents of a proposal.

First Step – Capitulation: The ill-constructed protocols signaling the beginning of formal relations between Armenia and Turkey received an uncertain and inauspicious signing in Zurich. The parties themselves and the representatives of the world powers, all were present but all remained silent. When such a ‘historic’ moment goes by with none of the sides or the witnesses able to say anything acceptable to the rest, either about the long-awaited event itself or the content of the documents being signed – it becomes obvious that these documents are in fact full of the contradictions and expectations that do not engender the serious trust and respect necessary for stable and respectful relations between countries.

Those within and outside Armenia who support this process label all those against it as nationalists, extremists or those who categorically reject all relations with Turkey. But I, and others like me, who have for decades wanted and continue to believe in the importance of Armenia-Turkey rapprochement are neither extremists or nationalists.

DEMEANING SIGNING FOR DEMEANING PROTOCOLS: On Saturday, October 10, we witnessed two consequential but sadly conflicting events. One was the signing of the miscalculated and ill-constructed Armenia-Turkey protocols, despite great domestic and international concern and opposition among Armenians. The second was President Sargsyan’s last-minute address to the Armenian people, issued just hours ahead of the scheduled signing, the content of which was directly and unabashedly contradictory to the content of the protocols.

Indeed, so different are the two that it can even be said that the president’s arguments were the best reasons to reject the protocols. The address insisted that there are irrefutable realities and we have undeniable rights; the protocols, on the other hand, question the first and eliminate the second. Armenia, without cause and without necessity, conceded its historic rights, both regarding genocide recognition and what the address so justly called 'hayrenazrkum' – a denial and dispossession of our patrimony.

The current Turkey-Armenia Protocols, with their ambiguous wording, are unfavorable to the interests of the Armenian state. What are the motives of the latter? Opening the Turkish Armenian border, while separating Turkey-Armenia relations from a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

Apparently, to substitute for this issue not being mentioned, Armenia has conceded for a "sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations, in which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take part.” Such wording should be unacceptable for an Armenian government worthy of the name. What is the goal of Turkish diplomacy, whose excellence cannot be denied, as demonstrated its progress during the recent years, with the impulsion of Recep Erdogan, and reach the following: 
- A recognition of existing borders between Turkey and Armenia; 
- Avoid at all costs that the term genocide is used for the events of 1915-1923.  
- Work in agreement with Azerbaijan for the return of Nagorno-Karabakh under the sovereignty of Baku.

This last point is implicit in the protocols, as Armenia and Turkey reaffirm "their commitment, in their bilateral and international relations, to respect and ensure respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non interference in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders”. (underline is mine).

Questions That Need Answers: The Diaspora was loud, forceful and often not even civil when it delivered its message to President Serzh Sargsyan during his five-city visit intended to explain the government’s position on the protocols and ostensibly to rally support.

What began inauspiciously in Paris continued in New York, Los Angeles and Beirut, and concluded in Rostov, albeit more mildly. At the end, one thing is clear. The organizers miscalculated. The content and the intensity of the reactions, responses and reception were different from what was customary and what was expected.

As a result, the government’s – more specifically, the president’s – message was not effective. The consequence of all of this is that the Diaspora is not on board. The Armenian public was already not collectively on board. Yet this is a policy and an action that requires solid support from a people who have lost much and who therefore believe they have much to lose still.