Azerbaijan’s minister of foreign affairs has found generally acceptable the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ new version of the principles for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, proposed last December in Greece. This is the first occasion since 1997 that Baku has found the mediators’ proposal acceptable.

Now, it is Armenia’s turn and it will be difficult for Armenia to say "Yes" to the version that took shape first in Krakow in July 2009, then in Athens at the end of 2009 and then in Sochi on January 25, 2010, because in contrast to the 2007 Madrid proposals, not only is the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination very vague, but in terms of removing the consequences of the conflict, Azerbaijan is at an advantage.

Since 1997, Azerbaijan has either rejected or withheld consent to all settlement proposals; it also rejected the Madrid document presented in 2007. And now, over the course of a mere two years, the mediators have presented proposals which are acceptable to Azerbaijan and unacceptable for Armenia. Refusing the mediators’ proposal comes at a price. And what is very important is who does the rejecting, and on what basis. Especially since proposals are the outcome of a negotiations process, the negotiating sides are equally responsible for the contents of a proposal.

President Sargsyan’s speech in London, in terms of its emphasis, was very similar to Armenia’s first President, Levon Ter-Petrossian’s speech in Lisbon, at the OSCE Summit, in December 1996. The international community, with the Swiss at the helm (at that time the OSCE chairman-in-office was Switzerland) and under Turkish-Russian-American pressure, was attempting to force a resolution; however, Armenia refused and explained why that which the international community wanted to impose was unacceptable.

There is no doubt that President Sargsyan is also right if he is rejecting the new Athens proposal for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, which the Azerbaijani president found acceptable in Sochi, creating an extremely uncomfortable situation for the Armenian president. Those proposals, which are unfavorable for Nagorno Karabkah, must be rejected. And in general, any proposal which does not clearly secure the right to self-determination for the people of Nagorno Karabakh, even as it offers Azerbaijan the prospect of territories being returned, must be rejected.

But another passage in President Sargsyan’s London speech is illogical, where he expresses his willingness to invite Ilham Aliyev to the ceremony of the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. This may appear to be a diplomatic innovation to many. In reality, if Turkey opens the border then Aliyev’s participation with Gul and Sargsyan at the ceremony, might mean that in return for an open border, Armenia has made concessions to Azerbaijan on the Nagorno Karabakh issue.

The frenzy with which Armenian authorities are chasing Turkey is incomprehensible and dangerous; this was further manifested on the journey to Great Britain. The closer the lifting of the blockade by Turkey, the more real will become the danger of ceding lands in Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia may simply be faced with a nightmare of a decision. It will be the Armenian authorities who will be solely responsible and guilty in this, for not having realized until the end, or not wanting to admit, that the two processes are linked to each other. The nearer we get to Armenia-Turkey rapprochement, the nearer we will be to ceding land in the NK issue without getting anything in return on Karabakh’s status – something which is unacceptable for the Armenian people and a dangerous prospect for the Armenian authorities.

The Turks have, on many occasions, said that they will not open the border and by sending messages to Gul, Armenia is making it easy for the Turks. Receiving similar messages from Armenia only serves one objective – successfully overcoming another “April 24.”